# Round 5 NDT – ASU RV vs. Liberty AB (Aff)

## 1AC

#### Same as CEDA Round 2 1AC.

## 2AC

### Solvency

#### Nat gas doesn’t kill investment – utilities will use nuclear as a hedge.

Lamonica ‘12

(Martin, “A Glut of Natural Gas Leaves Nuclear Power Stalled”, Technology Review by MIT, 8-9-2012, http://www.technologyreview.com/news/428737/a-glut-of-natural-gas-leaves-nuclear-power/)

Even in United States, of course, super cheap natural gas will not last forever. With supply exceeding demand, some drillers are said to be losing money on natural gas, which could push prices back up. Prices will also be pushed upward by utilities, as they come to rely on more natural gas for power generation, says James. Ali Azad, the chief business development officer at energy company Babcock & Wilcox, thinks the answer is making nuclear power smaller, cheaper, and faster. His is one of a handful of companies developing small modular reactors that can be built in three years, rather than 10 or more, for a fraction of the cost of gigawatt-size reactors. Although this technology is not yet commercially proven, the company has a customer in the Tennessee Valley Authority, which expects to have its first unit online in 2021 (see "A Preassembled Nuclear Reactor"). "When we arrive, we will have a level cost of energy on the grid, which competes favorably with a brand-new combined-cycle natural gas plants when gas prices are between $6 to $8," said Azad. He sees strong demand in power-hungry China and places such as Saudia Arabia, where power is needed for desalination. Even if natural gas remains cheaper, utilities don't want to find themselves with an overreliance on gas, which has been volatile on price in the past, so nuclear power will still contribute to the energy mix. "[Utilities] still continue [with nuclear] but with a lower level of enthusiasm—it's a hedging strategy," says Hans-Holger Rogner from the Planning and Economics Studies section of the International Atomic Energy Agency. "They don't want to pull all their eggs in one basket because of the new kid on the block called shale gas."

#### Their certainty about the effects of language belies the nature of human agency and the importance of context, making us powerless in the face of language – Extricating the language from the plan doesn’t make the words “go away”.

Butler 97 (Judith, Excitable Speech, UC-Berkeley, p. 13)

Indeed, recent effort to establish the incontrovertibly wounding power of certain words seem to founder on the question of who does the interpreting of what such words mean and what they perform. The recent regulations governing lesbian and gay self-definition in the military of, indeed, the recent controversies over rap music suggest that no clear consensus is possible on the question of whether there is a clear link between the words that are uttered and their putative power to injure. To argue, on the one hand, that the offensive effects of such words is fully contextual, and that a shift of context can exacerbate or minimize that offensiveness, is still not to give an account of the power that such words are said to exercise. To claim, on the other hand, that some utterances are always offensive, regardless of context, that they carry their contexts with them in ways that are too difficult to shed, is still not to offer a way to understand how context is invoked and restaged at the moment of utterance.

#### They can’t solve the case--Censoring words transforms politics into a fight over language rather than the institutions that generate true violence.

Brown 1 [Wendy Brown, professor at UC-Berkeley, 2001 Politics Out of History, p. 35-36]JFS

 “Speech codes kill critique,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech. Although Gates was referring to what happens when hate speech regulations, and the debates about them, usurp the discursive space in which one might have offered a substantive *political* response to bigoted epithets, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institutions. But turning political questions into moralistic ones—as speech codes of any sort do—not only prohibits certain questions and mandates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility toward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legislative and enforced truth. And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspirations into reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rationality and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction. Here we greet a persistent political paradox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thus Gates might have said, “Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conservative as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers. But moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty, violence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed. We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorientation, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Don’t mourn, moralize

### Waste

#### **SQUO enframes atomic energy and waste – plan is key to resolve this.**

Rawles, Lecturer at the University of Edinburgh, 2k

[Richard, “Coyote Learns to Glow”, Part of “Learning to Glow: A Nuclear Reader”, RSR]

Humans, having gathered uranium from the New Mexican desert not all that far from Yucca Mountain, have harnessed the energy within the atom, for commercial and security purposes, in effect by “tricking" nature out of its secret power. We are aided in our industry by this supposedly "free” energy source. As Martin Heidegger observed, we regard the natural world as a “standing reserve:’ there for the plundering-the military metaphor is more than apt in this case. Having stolen from nature its hidden fire, we delude ourselves into believing that there’s no reckoning, no balancing of accounts, despite even the scientific evidence, which tells us there are no free meals in nature’s unforgiving cycles. We are burdened by the waste from this virtual cornucopia, much as the Greeks of the early classical period projected into Pandora's box of woes the burdens of civilizing fire—its destructive aspects, along with the rituals needed to maintain the fire.

### Warming

#### No shift towards energy efficiency.

Jacobius, Staff Writer, 9-17

[Arleen, “Clean-tech investing littered with mines”, Pensions and Investments,

http://www.pionline.com/article/20120917/PRINTSUB/309179992/clean-tech-investing-littered-with-mines]

Clean technology managers are redoubling their efforts to attract capital, but investors will have to pick through a landscape of failed offerings to find the managers with winning strategies.¶ Six years ago, institutional investors began making large commitments to the sector. They bet that rising fuel costs and dwindling natural resources would create a huge investment opportunity in alternative energy.¶ The California Public Employees' Retirement System has made $1.1 billion in private equity commitments to the sector, including $480 million through its CalPERS Clean Energy and Technology Fund, $500 million in clean energy and technology funds and $200 million in its environmental technology program; the California State Teachers' Retirement System has about $667.5 million invested in clean tech; and the New York State Common Retirement Fund has more than $500 million committed to the sector.¶ So far, not all investments have worked out as planned, industry insiders said. Investors are still waiting for their clean-tech portfolios to produce expected returns. The reason is that many clean-tech investments are still sitting in managers' portfolios waiting for an exit.¶ Some venture capital managers will not be able to continue supporting these companies, sending executives at these firms off in search of other sources of capital, said Tracy Lefteroff, global managing partner of the venture capital practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers U.S. who is based in the firm's San Jose, Calif., office.¶ “I think there is a lot of interest in clean technology but not enough of profitable liquidity events to maintain a high level of investment or to attract new money,” Mr. Lefteroff said.

#### No tradeoff.

Scandurra and Romano ‘11

(Giuseppe and Antonio Angelo, Department of Statistical Mathematics and Economics at the University of Napoli, “The investments in renewable energy sources: do low carbon economies better invest in green technologies?”, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 2011, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34216/2/MPRA\_paper\_34216.pdf)

If it can have some statistical significance, the estimates in the low carbon economies are generally higher, in absolute value, than in the high carbon sample, except the autoregressive parameters. In fact, the influence of investments in renewable energy source is stronger in the high carbon countries than to the other countries (low carbon). The former try to invest mostly in renewable sources in order to reduce their footprint and respect the international agreement that they ratified. Significant is the inverse relationship between renewable investments and share of nuclear consumption. Probably, the continuous base load electricity ensured by nuclear power plants and the absence of greenhouse gas emission allow these countries to invest in additional renewable energy in a complementary way, in order to reach an optimal energy mix and to ensure the subsidies for investment in renewable energy.

### Wilderson

#### Four reasons we will win this debate: the warming advantage, the native advantage, the permutation and the alt fails.

#### First, the warming advantage.

#### Climate change outweighs the K because it hurts those who struggle the most because of their social location and the ability to deal with those harms. Formulating our politics allows for a transformation of the entirety of the political. That’s key to deal with structural problems of the status quo. That’s 1AC Hoerner and 1AC Smith.

#### **We also have the biggest in round impact – deliberation over policy and warming is the critical internal link to teach us to be better advocates against oppression in the real world.**

CAG, ’10 (Climate Change Communication Advisory Group. Dr Adam Corner School of Psychology, Cardiff University - Dr Tom Crompton Change Strategist, WWF-UK - Scott Davidson Programme Manager, Global Action Plan - Richard Hawkins Senior Researcher, Public Interest Research Centre - Professor Tim Kasser, Psychology department, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois, USA. - Dr Renee Lertzman, Center for Sustainable Processes & Practices, Portland State University, US. - Peter Lipman, Policy Director, Sustrans. - Dr Irene Lorenzoni, Centre for Environmental Risk, University of East Anglia. - George Marshall, Founding Director, Climate Outreach , Information Network - Dr Ciaran Mundy, Director, Transition Bristol - Dr Saffron O’Neil, Department of Resource Management and Geography, University of Melbourne, Australia. - Professor Nick Pidgeon, Director, Understanding Risk Research Group, School of Psychology, Cardiff University. - Dr Anna Rabinovich, School of Psychology, University of Exeter - Rosemary Randall, Founder and director of Cambridge Carbon Footprint - Dr Lorraine Whitmarsh, School of Psychology, Cardiff University & Visiting Fellow at the, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Communicating climate change to mass public audience, http://pirc.info/downloads/communicating\_climate\_mass\_audiences.pdf)

This short advisory paper collates a set of recommendations about how best to shape mass public communications aimed at increasing concern about climate change and motivating commensurate behavioural changes.¶ Its focus is not upon motivating small private-sphere behavioural changes on a piece-meal basis. Rather, it marshals evidence about how best to motivate the ambitious and systemic behavioural change that is necessary – including, crucially, greater public engagement with the policy process (through, for example, lobbying decision-makers and elected representatives, or participating in demonstrations), as well as major lifestyle changes. ¶ Political leaders themselves have drawn attention to the imperative for more vocal public pressure to create the ‘political space’ for them to enact more ambitious policy interventions. 1 While this paper does not dismiss the value of individuals making small private-sphere behavioural changes (for example, adopting simple domestic energy efficiency measures) it is clear that such behaviours do not, in themselves, represent a proportional response to the challenge of climate change. As David MacKay, Chief Scientific Advisor to the UK Department of Energy and Climate change writes: “Don’t be distracted by the myth that ‘every little helps’. If everyone does a little, we’ll achieve only a little” (MacKay, 2008).¶ The task of campaigners and communicators from government, business and non-governmental organisations must therefore be to motivate both (i) widespread adoption of ambitious private-sphere behavioural changes; and (ii) widespread acceptance of – and indeed active demand for – ambitious new policy interventions.¶ Current public communication campaigns, as orchestrated by government, business and non-governmental organisations, are not achieving these changes. This paper asks: how should such communications be designed if they are to have optimal impact in motivating these changes? The response to this question will require fundamental changes in the ways that many climate change communication campaigns are currently devised and implemented. ¶ This advisory paper offers a list of principles that could be used to enhance the quality of communication around climate change communications. The authors are each engaged in continuously sifting the evidence from a range of sub-disciplines within psychology, and reflecting on the implications of this for improving climate change communications. Some of the organisations that we represent have themselves at times adopted approaches which we have both learnt from and critique in this paper – so some of us have first hand experience of the need for on-going improvement in the strategies that we deploy. ¶ The changes we advocate will be challenging to enact – and will require vision and leadership on the part of the organisations adopting them. But without such vision and leadership, we do not believe that public communication campaigns on climate change will create the necessary behavioural changes – indeed, there is a profound risk that many of today’s campaigns will actually prove counter-productive. ¶ Seven Principles¶ 1. Move Beyond Social Marketing¶ We believe that too little attention is paid to the understanding that psychologists bring to strategies for motivating change, whilst undue faith is often placed in the application of marketing strategies to ‘sell’ behavioural changes. Unfortunately, in the context of ambitious pro-environmental behaviour, such strategies seem unlikely to motivate systemic behavioural change.¶ Social marketing is an effective way of achieving a particular behavioural goal – dozens of practical examples in the field of health behaviour attest to this. Social marketing is really more of a framework for designing behaviour change programmes than a behaviour change programme - it offers a method of maximising the success of a specific behavioural goal. Darnton (2008) has described social marketing as ‘explicitly transtheoretical’, while Hastings (2007), in a recent overview of social marketing, claimed that there is no theory of social marketing. Rather, it is a ‘what works’ philosophy, based on previous experience of similar campaigns and programmes. Social marketing is flexible enough to be applied to a range of different social domains, and this is undoubtedly a fundamental part of its appeal.¶ However, social marketing’s 'what works' status also means that it is agnostic about the longer term, theoretical merits of different behaviour change strategies, or the cultural values that specific campaigns serve to strengthen. Social marketing dictates that the most effective strategy should be chosen, where effective means ‘most likely to achieve an immediate behavioural goal’. ¶ This means that elements of a behaviour change strategy designed according to the principles of social marketing may conflict with other, broader goals. What if the most effective way of promoting pro-environmental behaviour ‘A’ was to pursue a strategy that was detrimental to the achievement of long term pro-environmental strategy ‘Z’? The principles of social marketing have no capacity to resolve this conflict – they are limited to maximising the success of the immediate behavioural programme. This is not a flaw of social marketing – it was designed to provide tools to address specific behavioural problems on a piecemeal basis. But it is an important limitation, and one that has significant implications if social marketing techniques are used to promote systemic behavioural change and public engagement on an issue like climate change. ¶ 2. Be honest and forthright about the probable impacts of climate change, and the scale of the challenge we confront in avoiding these. But avoid deliberate attempts to provoke fear or guilt. ¶ There is no merit in ‘dumbing down’ the scientific evidence that the impacts of climate change are likely to be severe, and that some of these impacts are now almost certainly unavoidable. Accepting the impacts of climate change will be an important stage in motivating behavioural responses aimed at mitigating the problem. However, deliberate attempts to instil fear or guilt carry considerable risk. ¶ Studies on fear appeals confirm the potential for fear to change attitudes or verbal expressions of concern, but often not actions or behaviour (Ruiter et al., 2001). The impact of fear appeals is context - and audience - specific; for example, for those who do not yet realise the potentially ‘scary’ aspects of climate change, people need to first experience themselves as vulnerable to the risks in some way in order to feel moved or affected (Das et al, 2003; Hoog et al, 2005). As people move towards contemplating action, fear appeals can help form a behavioural intent, providing an impetus or spark to ‘move’ from; however such appeals must be coupled with constructive information and support to reduce the sense of danger (Moser, 2007). The danger is that fear can also be disempowering – producing feelings of helplessness, remoteness and lack of control (O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Fear is likely to trigger ‘barriers to engagement’, such as denial2 (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Weber, 2006; Moser and Dilling, 2007; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole & Whitmarsh, 2007). The location of fear in a message is also relevant; it works better when placed first for those who are inclined to follow the advice, but better second for those who aren't (Bier, 2001).¶ Similarly, studies have shown that guilt can play a role in motivating people to take action but can also function to stimulate defensive mechanisms against the perceived threat or challenge to one’s sense of identity (as a good, moral person). In the latter case, behaviours may be left untouched (whether driving a SUV or taking a flight) as one defends against any feelings of guilt or complicity through deployment of a range of justifications for the behaviour (Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010). ¶ Overall, there is a need for emotionally balanced representations of the issues at hand. This will involve acknowledging the ‘affective reality’ of the situation, e.g. “We know this is scary and overwhelming, but many of us feel this way and we are doing something about it”.¶ 3. Be honest and forthright about the impacts of mitigating and adapting to climate change for current lifestyles, and the ‘loss’ - as well as the benefits - that these will entail. Narratives that focus exclusively on the ‘up-side’ of climate solutions are likely to be unconvincing. While narratives about the future impacts of climate change may highlight the loss of much that we currently hold to be dear, narratives about climate solutions frequently ignore the question of loss. If the two are not addressed concurrently, fear of loss may be ‘split off’ and projected into the future, where it is all too easily denied. This can be dangerous, because accepting loss is an important step towards working through the associated emotions, and emerging with the energy and creativity to respond positively to the new situation (Randall, 2009). However, there are plenty of benefits (besides the financial ones) of a low-carbon lifestyle e.g., health, community/social interaction - including the ‘intrinsic' goals mentioned below. It is important to be honest about both the losses and the benefits that may be associated with lifestyle change, and not to seek to separate out one from the other.¶ 3a. Avoid emphasis upon painless, easy steps. ¶ Be honest about the limitations of voluntary private-sphere behavioural change, and the need for ambitious new policy interventions that incentivise such changes, or that regulate for them. People know that the scope they have, as individuals, to help meet the challenge of climate change is extremely limited. For many people, it is perfectly sensible to continue to adopt high-carbon lifestyle choices whilst simultaneously being supportive of government interventions that would make these choices more difficult for everyone. ¶ The adoption of small-scale private sphere behavioural changes is sometimes assumed to lead people to adopt ever more difficult (and potentially significant) behavioural changes. The empirical evidence for this ‘foot-in-thedoor’ effect is highly equivocal. Some studies detect such an effect; others studies have found the reverse effect (whereby people tend to ‘rest on their laurels’ having adopted a few simple behavioural changes - Thogersen and Crompton, 2009). Where attention is drawn to simple and painless privatesphere behavioural changes, these should be urged in pursuit of a set of intrinsic goals (that is, as a response to people’s understanding about the contribution that such behavioural change may make to benefiting their friends and family, their community, the wider world, or in contributing to their growth and development as individuals) rather than as a means to achieve social status or greater financial success. Adopting behaviour in pursuit of intrinsic goals is more likely to lead to ‘spillover’ into other sustainable behaviours (De Young, 2000; Thogersen and Crompton, 2009).¶ People aren’t stupid: they know that if there are wholesale changes in the global climate underway, these will not be reversed merely through checking their tyre pressures or switching their TV off standby. An emphasis upon simple and painless steps suppresses debate about those necessary responses that are less palatable – that will cost people money, or that will infringe on cherished freedoms (such as to fly). Recognising this will be a key step in accepting the reality of loss of aspects of our current lifestyles, and in beginning to work through the powerful emotions that this will engender (Randall, 2009). ¶ 3b. Avoid over-emphasis on the economic opportunities that mitigating, and adapting to, climate change may provide. ¶ There will, undoubtedly, be economic benefits to be accrued through investment in new technologies, but there will also be instances where the economic imperative and the climate change adaptation or mitigation imperative diverge, and periods of economic uncertainty for many people as some sectors contract. It seems inevitable that some interventions will have negative economic impacts (Stern, 2007).¶ Undue emphasis upon economic imperatives serves to reinforce the dominance, in society, of a set of extrinsic goals (focussed, for example, on financial benefit). A large body of empirical research demonstrates that these extrinsic goals are antagonistic to the emergence of pro-social and proenvironmental concern (Crompton and Kasser, 2009).¶ 3c. Avoid emphasis upon the opportunities of ‘green consumerism’ as a response to climate change.¶ As mentioned above (3b), a large body of research points to the antagonism between goals directed towards the acquisition of material objects and the emergence of pro-environmental and pro-social concern (Crompton and Kasser, 2009). Campaigns to ‘buy green’ may be effective in driving up sales of particular products, but in conveying the impression that climate change can be addressed by ‘buying the right things’, they risk undermining more difficult and systemic changes. A recent study found that people in an experiment who purchased ‘green’ products acted less altruistically on subsequent tasks (Mazar & Zhong, 2010) – suggesting that small ethical acts may act as a ‘moral offset’ and licence undesirable behaviours in other domains. This does not mean that private-sphere behaviour changes will always lead to a reduction in subsequent pro-environmental behaviour, but it does suggest that the reasons used to motivate these changes are critically important. Better is to emphasise that ‘every little helps a little’ – but that these changes are only the beginning of a process that must also incorporate more ambitious private-sphere change and significant collective action at a political level.¶ 4. Empathise with the emotional responses that will be engendered by a forthright presentation of the probable impacts of climate change. ¶ Belief in climate change and support for low-carbon policies will remain fragile unless people are emotionally engaged. We should expect people to be sad or angry, to feel guilt or shame, to yearn for that which is lost or to search for more comforting answers (Randall, 2009). Providing support and empathy in working through the painful emotions of 'grief' for a society that must undergo changes is a prerequisite for subsequent adaptation to new circumstances.¶ Without such support and empathy, it is more likely that people will begin to deploy a range of maladaptive ‘coping strategies’, such as denial of personal responsibility, blaming others, or becoming apathetic (Lertzman, 2008). An audience should not be admonished for deploying such strategies – this would in itself be threatening, and could therefore harden resistance to positive behaviour change (Miller and Rolnick, 2002). The key is not to dismiss people who exhibit maladaptive coping strategies, but to understand how they can be made more adaptive. People who feel socially supported will be more likely to adopt adaptive emotional responses - so facilitating social support for proenvironmental behaviour is crucial.¶ 5. Promote pro-environmental social norms and harness the power of social networks¶ One way of bridging the gap between private-sphere behaviour changes and collective action is the promotion of pro-environmental social norms. Pictures and videos of ordinary people (‘like me’) engaging in significant proenvironmental actions are a simple and effective way of generating a sense of social normality around pro-environmental behaviour (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein and Griskevicius, 2007). There are different reasons that people adopt social norms, and encouraging people to adopt a positive norm simply to ‘conform’, to avoid a feeling of guilt, or for fear of not ‘fitting in’ is likely to produce a relatively shallow level of motivation for behaviour change. Where social norms can be combined with ‘intrinsic’ motivations (e.g. a sense of social belonging), they are likely to be more effective and persistent.¶ Too often, environmental communications are directed to the individual as a single unit in the larger social system of consumption and political engagement. This can make the problems feel too overwhelming, and evoke unmanageable levels of anxiety. Through the enhanced awareness of what other people are doing, a strong sense of collective purpose can be engendered. One factor that is likely to influence whether adaptive or maladaptive coping strategies are selected in response to fear about climate change is whether people feel supported by a social network – that is, whether a sense of ‘sustainable citizenship’ is fostered. The efficacy of groupbased programmes at promoting pro-environmental behaviour change has been demonstrated on numerous occasions – and participants in these projects consistently point to a sense of mutual learning and support as a key reason for making and maintaining changes in behaviour (Nye and Burgess, 2008). There are few influences more powerful than an individual’s social network. Networks are instrumental not just in terms of providing social support, but also by creating specific content of social identity – defining what it means to be “us”. If environmental norms are incorporated at this level (become defining for the group) they can result in significant behavioural change (also reinforced through peer pressure).¶ Of course, for the majority of people, this is unlikely to be a network that has climate change at its core. But social networks – Trade Unions, Rugby Clubs, Mother & Toddler groups – still perform a critical role in spreading change through society. Encouraging and supporting pre-existing social networks to take ownership of climate change (rather than approach it as a problem for ‘green groups’) is a critical task. As well as representing a crucial bridge between individuals and broader society, peer-to-peer learning circumnavigates many of the problems associated with more ‘top down’ models of communication – not least that government representatives are perceived as untrustworthy (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). Peer-to-peer learning is more easily achieved in group-based dialogue than in designing public information films: But public information films can nonetheless help to establish social norms around community-based responses to the challenges of climate change, through clear visual portrayals of people engaging collectively in the pro-environmental behaviour.¶ The discourse should be shifted increasingly from ‘you’ to ‘we’ and from ‘I’ to ‘us’. This is starting to take place in emerging forms of community-based activism, such as the Transition Movement and Cambridge Carbon Footprint’s ‘Carbon Conversations’ model – both of which recognize the power of groups to help support and maintain lifestyle and identity changes. A nationwide climate change engagement project using a group-based behaviour change model with members of Trade Union networks is currently underway, led by the Climate Outreach and Information Network. These projects represent a method of climate change communication and engagement radically different to that typically pursued by the government – and may offer a set of approaches that can go beyond the limited reach of social marketing techniques.¶ One potential risk with appeals based on social norms is that they often contain a hidden message. So, for example, a campaign that focuses on the fact that too many people take internal flights actually contains two messages – that taking internal flights is bad for the environment, and that lots of people are taking internal flights. This second message can give those who do not currently engage in that behaviour a perverse incentive to do so, and campaigns to promote behaviour change should be very careful to avoid this. The key is to ensure that information about what is happening (termed descriptive norms), does not overshadow information about what should be happening (termed injunctive norms). ¶ 6. Think about the language you use, but don’t rely on language alone¶ A number of recent publications have highlighted the results of focus group research and talk-back tests in order to ‘get the language right’ (Topos Partnership, 2009; Western Strategies & Lake Research Partners, 2009), culminating in a series of suggestions for framing climate-change communications. For example, these two studies led to the suggestions that communicators should use the term ‘global warming’ or ‘our deteriorating atmosphere’, respectively, rather than ‘climate change’. Other research has identified systematic differences in the way that people interpret the terms ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’, with ‘global warming’ perceived as more emotionally engaging than ‘climate change’ (Whitmarsh, 2009).¶ Whilst ‘getting the language right’ is important, it can only play a small part in a communication strategy. More important than the language deployed (i.e. ‘conceptual frames') are what have been referred to by some cognitive linguists as 'deep frames'. Conceptual framing refers to catchy slogans and clever spin (which may or may not be honest). At a deeper level, framing refers to forging the connections between a debate or public policy and a set of deeper values or principles. Conceptual framing (crafting particular messages focussing on particular issues) cannot work unless these messages resonate with a set of long-term deep frames.¶ Policy proposals which may at the surface level seem similar (perhaps they both set out to achieve a reduction in environmental pollution) may differ importantly in terms of their deep framing. For example, putting a financial value on an endangered species, and building an economic case for their conservation ‘commodifies’ them, and makes them equivalent (at the level of deep frames) to other assets of the same value (a hotel chain, perhaps). This is a very different frame to one that attempts to achieve the same conservation goals through the ascription of intrinsic value to such species – as something that should be protected in its own right. Embedding particular deep frames requires concerted effort (Lakoff, 2009), but is the beginning of a process that can build a broad, coherent cross-departmental response to climate change from government.¶ 7. Encourage public demonstrations of frustration at the limited pace of government action¶ Private-sphere behavioural change is not enough, and may even at times become a diversion from the more important process of bringing political pressure to bear on policy-makers. The importance of public demonstrations of frustration at both the lack of political progress on climate change and the barriers presented by vested interests is widely recognised – including by government itself. Climate change communications, including government communication campaigns, should work to normalise public displays of frustration with the slow pace of political change. Ockwell et al (2009) argued that communications can play a role in fostering demand for - as well as acceptance of - policy change. Climate change communication could (and should) be used to encourage people to demonstrate (for example through public demonstrations) about how they would like structural barriers to behavioural/societal change to be removed.

#### We also have to inform our discussion by climate science because it’s key to check special interests that perpetuate the harms in the SQUO. That’s 1AC Hansen.

#### Warming also turns the K – as explained above it disproportionately affects those who don’t have the ability to deal with warming’s effects. Those that are deemed as socially dead are the first ones to go in our warming scenario. African Americans are disproportionately more vulnerable to the impacts of disasters as they often lack the disposable income necessary to deal with the resultant costs. They also spend more on energy policy and would be uniquely benefitted by the expansion of renewable forms of electricity. That’s 1AC Dorner. The plan also uniquely solves the downsides to status quo nuclear power. It allows for a new organizing calculus whereby people can unify and reform politics under the banner of climate change. That’s 1AC Smith.

#### The alt cannot resolve this - they might that win our solutions to global warming and native waste occur against the backdrop against anti-Blackness but they cannot win that the reality of warming and waste as problems are determined by anti-blackness. We have evidence which indicates that this is a scientific, geological problem that does not care about the color of your skin. Therefore, you should evaluate the alts ability to mobilize against global warming.

#### Second, the waste advantage.

#### Waste is going to outweigh the criticism because our dumping of waste and unethical practices related to uranium mining perpetuate the harmful aspects of status quo state strictures. This violence perpetuated is apriori because it’s ontological.

Wilderson 2010 [FB, Red, White, & Black]

Again, if Accumulation and Fungibility are the modalities through which embodied Blackness is positioned as incapacity, then Genocide is that modality through which embodied Redness is positioned as incapacity. Ontological incapacity, I have inferred and here state forthright, is the constituent element of ethics. Put another way, one cannot embody capacity and be, simultaneously, ethical. Where there are Slaves it is unethical to be free. The Settler/Master’s capacity, I have argued, is a function of exploitation and alienation; and the Slave’s incapacity is elaborated by accumulation and fungibility. But the “Savage” is positioned, structurally, by subjective capacity and objective incapacity, by sovereignty and genocide, respectively. It is the Indian’s liminal status in political economy, the manner in which her/his positionality shuttles between the incapacity of a genocided object and the capacity of a sovereign subject, coupled with the fact that Redness does not overdetermine the “thanatology” (Judy 89, 94) of libidinal economy—this liminal capacity within political economy and complete freedom from incapacity within libidinal economy—which raises serious doubts about the status of “Savage” ethicality vis-à-vis the triangulated structure (Red, White, and Black) of antagonisms. Clearly, the coherence of Whiteness as a structural position in modernity depends on the capacity to be free from genocide, not, perhaps, as an historical experience, but at least as a positioning modality. This embodied capacity (genocidal immunity) of Whiteness jettisons the White/Red relation from that of a conflict and marks it as an antagonism: it stains it with irreconcilability. Here, the Indian comes into being, and is positioned, by an a priori violence of genocide. Whiteness can also experience this kind of violence but only a fortiori: genocide may be one of a thousand contingent experiences of Whiteness but it is not a constituent element, it does not make Whites White (or Humans Human). Whiteness can grasp its own capacity, be present to itself, coherent, by its unavailability to the a priori violence of Red genocide, as well as by its unavailability to the a priori violence of Black accumulation and fungibility. If it experiences accumulation and fungibility, or genocide, those experiences must be named, qualified, i.e. “White slavery,” or the Armenian massacre, the Jewish Holocaust, Bosnian interment, so that such contingent experience is not confused with ontological necessity. In such a position one can always say, “I’m not a ‘Savage’” or “I’m being treated like a nigger.” One can reassert one’s Humanity by refusing the ruse of analogy. Regardless of Whites’ historical, and brief, encounters with the modalities of the “Savage” and of the Slave, these modalities do not break in on the position of Whiteness with such a force as to replace exploitation and alienation as the Settler/Master’s constituent elements. We might think of exploitation and alienation as modalities of suffering which inoculate Whiteness from death. If this is indeed the case, then perhaps Whiteness has no constituent elements other than the immanent status of immunity. Still, this immunity is no small matter, for it is the sin qua non of Human capacity.

#### This is the biggest in round impact because our ability as communication scholars to engage the issue of waste disposal on native lands represents a critical break from status structures that allow this violence to perpetuate itself. Us as rhetorical critics allow for the inclusion of multiple perspectives that allow for us to challenge the structures that perpetuated these problems in the first place. That’s 1AC Endres.

#### This also turns the K because the apriority of genocide perpetuates the ability of Whiteness to relate blackness from a position where Whiteness is free from genocide. The ontological incapacity of the native body is the constituent element of our ethical relationships per the K. That’s Wilderson above and Kuletz from the 1AC.

#### The criticism cannot resolve these claims because it does not position us from the role of an academic scholar that relates also as a public policy advocate who can promote real world change. The alternative forgoes any opportunity we have of dealing with the tangible impacts of waste that already exists in the status quo. That’s 1AC Bullard and Johnson.

#### Third, the permutation.

#### Perm do both. Embrace their criticism through our policy making framework. A policy focus is key to challenge structures of white supremacy.

Themba-Nixon 2k, Executive Director of The Praxis Project, a nonprofit organization helping communities use media and policy advocacy

Makani, July 31, Colorlines, Changing the Rules: What Public Policy Means for Organizing, Vol 3.2)

 “This is all about policy," a woman complained to me in a recent conversation. "I'm an organizer." The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. **Policy is for** wonks, sell-out politicians, and **ivory-tower eggheads**. **Organizing is what real**, grassroots **people do**. Common as it may be, **this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world**. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. **Given who's usually present**, **most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites**. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, **policies are the codification of power relationships** and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, **if organizing is about changing the rules and building power**, **how can organizing be separated from policies**? **Can we** really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or **win racial justice without contesting** the rules and the rulers, **the policies and the policymakers**? **The answer is no**-and double no **for people of color**. Today, **racism subtly dominates** nearly every aspect of **policymaking**. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. History has taught us that, for social services and civil rights in particular, the **lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability lead to** uneven enforcement and even **discriminatory implementation of policies**. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing **progressive initiatives** in this more localized environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were heretofore out of reach. To do so will **require careful attention to the mechanics of** local **policymaking** and a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. **By getting into the policy arena** in a proactive manner, **we can take our demands to the next level**. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, **this work requires** a certain amount of **interaction with** "the suits," as well as struggles with **the bureaucracy**, **the technical language**, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, **policy work is** just one tool in our box.

#### The permutation resolves the entirety of the criticism because we allow for a paradigmatic inclusion of the politics of the black body into civil society.

#### The warming and native advantages are giant net benefits to the permutation because resolving these questions is only possible in the world of the affirmative.

#### Fourth, the alternative fails.

#### Focusing upon the traumatic elements of black subjectivity denies the agency present within black attempts at thwarting white supremacy and domination. Specifically, this prevents them from resolving issues of waste dumping and uranium mining that is promoted by structures constituted by whiteness.

Walker 12 (Tracey, Graduate of Psychosocial Studies at Birbeck University of London, Graduate Journal of Social Science July 2012, Vol. 9, Issue 2, " The Future of Slavery: From Cultural Trauma to Ethical Remembrance" http://gjss.org/images/stories/volumes/9/2/Walker%20Article.pdf)

To argue that there is more to the popular conception of slaves as victims who experienced social death within the abusive regime of transatlantic slavery is not to say that these subjectivities did not exist. When considering the institution of slavery we can quite confidently rely on the assumption that it did indeed de- stroy the self-hood and the lives of millions of Africans. Scholar Vincent Brown (2009) however, has criticised Orlando Patterson’s (1982) seminal book Slavery and Social Death for positioning the slave as a subject without agency and maintains that those who managed to dislocate from the nightmare of plantation life ‘were not in fact the living dead’, but ‘the mothers of gasping new societies’ (Brown 2009, 1241).¶ The Jamaican Maroons were one such disparate group of Africans who managed to band together and flee the Jamaican plantations in or- der to create a new mode of living under their own rule. These ‘run- aways’ were in fact ‘ferocious fight- ers and master strategists’, building towns and military bases which en- abled them to fight and successfully win the war against the British army after 200 years of battle (Gotlieb 2000,16). In addition, the story of the Windward Jamaican Maroons disrupts the phallocentricism in- herent within the story of the slave ‘hero’ by the very revelation that their leader, ‘Queen Nanny’ was a woman (Gotlieb 2000). As a leader, she was often ignored by early white historians who dismissed her as an ‘old hagg’ or ‘obeah’ woman (possessor of evil magic powers) (Gotlieb 2000, xvi). Yet, despite these negative descriptors, Nanny presents an interesting image of an African woman in the time of slavery who cultivated an exceptional army and used psychological as well as military force against the English despite not owning sophisticated weapons (Gotlieb 2000). As an oral tale, her story speaks to post-slavery generations through its representa- tion of a figure whose gender defy- ing acts challenged the patriarchal fantasies of the Eurocentric imagi- nary and as such ‘the study of her experiences might change the lives of people living under paternalistic, racist, classist and gender based oppression’ (Gotlieb 2000, 84).¶ The label of ‘social death’ is re- jected here on the grounds that it is a narrative which is positioned from the vantage point of a European hegemonic ideology. Against the social symbolic and its gaze, black slaves were indeed regarded as non-humans since their lives were stunted, diminished and deemed less valuable in comparison to the Europeans. However, Fanon’s (1967) assertion that ‘not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man’ (Fanon 1967, 110) helps us to un- derstand that this classification can only have meaning relative to the symbolic which represents the alive-ness of whiteness against the back- drop of the dead black slave (Dyer 1997). Butler (2005) makes it clear that the ‘death’ one suffers relative to the social symbolic is imbued with the fantasy that having constructed the Other and interpellated her into ‘life’, one now holds the sovereignty of determining the subject’s right to live or die: ¶ this death, if it is a death, is only the death of a certain kind of sub- ject, one that was never possible to begin with, the death of the fan- tasy of impossible mastery, and so a loss of what one never had, in other words it is a necessary grief (Butler 2005, 65).¶ The point to make here is that al- though the concept of social death has proved useful for theorists to de- scribe the metaphysical experience of those who live antagonistically in relation to the social symbolic, it is nevertheless a colonial narrative within which the slaves are confined to a one dimensional story of terror. In keeping with Gilroy’s (1993b) argument that the memory of slav- ery must be constructed from the slaves’ point of view, we might in- stead concentrate, not on the way in which the slaves are figured within the European social imaginary, but on how they negotiated their own ideas about self and identity. We might therefore find some value in studying a group like the Maroons who not only managed to create an autonomous world outside of the¶ hegemonic discourse which ne- gated them, but also, due to their unique circumstances, were forced to create new modes of communi- cation which would include a myriad of African cultures, languages and creeds (Gottlieb 2000). This cre- ative and resistive energy of slave subjectivity not only disrupts the colonial paradigm of socially dead slaves, but also implies the ethical tropes of creation, renewal and mu- tual recognition.¶ In contrast, the passive slave proved to feature heavily in the 2007 bicentenary commemorations causing journalist Toyin Agbetu to interrupt the official speeches and exclaim that it had turned into a discourse of freedom engineered mostly by whites with stories of black agency excluded8. Young’s argu- ment that ‘one of the damaging side effects of the focus on white peo- ple’s role in abolition is that Africans are represented as being passive in the face of oppression’, appears to echo the behaviour in the UK today given that a recent research poll re- veals that the black vote turnout is significantly lower than for the white majority electorate and that forty percent of second generation ‘immi- grants’ believe that voting ‘doesn’t matter’.9 Yet, Gilroy (1993a) argues that this political passivity may not simply be a self fulfilling prophecy, but might allude to the ‘lived contra- diction’ of being black and English which affects one’s confidence about whether opinions will be validated in a society that, at its core, still holds on to the fantasy of European supe- riority (Gilroy 1993a). Without con- sidering the slaves’ capacity for sur- vival and their fundamental role in overthrowing the European regime of slavery, we limit the use–value of the memory and risk becoming overly attached to singular slave subjectivities seeped in death and passivity. The Maroons story how- ever, enables slave consciousness to rise above the mire of slavery’s abject victims and establishes an ethical relation with our ancestors who lived and survived in the time of slavery.

#### Referring to the “black body” as a site of contestation in physical objectified terms is part of a duality that elevates the white mind and justifies further oppression.

Alley-Young 8 (July 2008, Gordon Alley-Young, Assistant Professor in the Department of Communications and Performing Arts at Kingsborough Community College-City University of New York, “Articulating Identity: Refining Postcolonial and Whiteness Perspectives on Race within Communication Studies,” The Review of Communication Vol. 8, No. 3, July 2008)

Descartes’ (1968) mind-body dichotomy holds that the body is divisible into its constitutive parts but that the mind is not. Postcolonial writers adapt Descartes’ (1968) dichotomy to explain how the colonial relationship situated whites and natives. In the postcolonial dichotomy white represents the mind and logic, perceiving natives as physical and illogical bodies requiring domination and control. Mohanram (1999, p. 15) cites claims of a ‘‘European universal subject’’ in colonial discourse. Such claims position white colonials as mobile, transportable, and logical as compared to the native person who is fixed to physical place and illogical. Such thinking allowed imperial nations to justify colonization as imposing logic and order on what they perceived to be illogical and underdeveloped people.¶ The postcolonial mind body dichotomy leaves the dimensions of the white body undeveloped. Dyer (1997, p. 6) describes experiencing his white body as ‘‘tightness, with self-control, self-consciousness, mind over body’’ when dancing among black bodies. Dyer’s (1997) comments suggest an experience of the white body that is informed by Cartesian thought. However, Dyer (1997) also seems to suggest that this white􏰀black physical difference is a reality, even if a socially constructed reality, while postcolonialism is suspect of such distinctions. Postcolonial writer Fanon (1967, p. 129) cites a frustrated friend who states, ‘‘When the whites feel that they have become too mechanized, they turn to the man of colour . . . for a little human sustenance.’’¶ In conflating whiteness with the mind this dichotomy suggests a rational, logical, and absent white body. The colonial perspective views the mind’s control over the white body as preferable to the body acting on its own physical impulses. The colonial perspective seeks to restrain, regulate, and/or educate the native body. The problem, Mohanram (1999) notes, is that the dichotomy reifies white colonialists’ belief that the white mind can develop but the black body cannot. This dichotomy negates native subjectivity by making natives physical bodies and thus objects that can be owned by the colonizer. Banton (2002) notes that, despite all the differences inherent in the colonial relationship, it was ‘‘complexion that came above all to serve as the sign of where a person belonged in the new social order’’ (p. 25). The black body became an object owned by this new social order. The dichotomy is a hierarchy but also a separation of subject from object.¶ One consequence of communicating about the native/black body as a physical object is that natives become hyper-sexualized (Mohanram, 1999) in the white imagination as sexually endowed (Dyer, 1997) and/or sexually violent (Fanon, 1967). Such myths reinforced colonizers’ resolve to control and restrict native bodies. This consequence surfaces in white, female colonists’ preoccupation with saving the native woman (Gandhi, 1998; Mohanram, 1999; Trinh, 1986/1987a, 1986/1987b). Colonial women perceived native men to be violent, oppressive tyrants and the native woman to be ignorant of their own oppression, thus requiring the help of enlightened, white, western women. This paternalistic thinking ignores native women’s strong cultural allegiances and views native culture as physically oppressive and needing western intervention.

## 1AR

### Wilderson

#### Their card concludes aff – individual focus fails to change warming or challenge the racial status quo

Mandell 8 (Bekah JD “Racial Reification and Global Warming: A Truly Inconvenient Truth” 4-1-8, http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046andcontext=twlj Boston College Third World Law Journal Volume 28 Issue 2 accessed: 10-27-12 mlb)

Fear of eroding the hierarchies that define race explains why poli- ticians and other elites have consistently championed ineffectual “mar- ket-based approaches” to global warming.36 By focusing public and pri- vate energy on relatively insignificant individual behavior changes, the Bush administration and other privileged elites are able to maintain the racial hierarchy that consolidates their economic and social power.37 Politicians know that “[w]ithout white-over-black the state withers away.”38 Therefore, they have a profound incentive to maintain the ra- cial hierarchy. Unsurprisingly, “because th[ese elites] accrue social and economic benefits by maintaining the status quo, they inevitably do.”39 This white consensus to maintain the spatial and mobility hierarchies that reify race is possible because, “[w]hite privilege thrives in highly racialized societies that espouse racial equality, but in which whites will not tolerate being either inconvenienced in order to achieve racial equality . . . or being denied the full benefits of their whiteness . . . .”40 With so much white privilege to lose, it becomes clear why even most passionate environmental advocates are far more willing to call for, and make, small non-structural changes in their behavior to ameliorate global warming, but are unwilling to embrace significant or meaningful actions to address the crisis.41¶ Even as global warming is starting to become the subject of in- creasing media coverage and as more environmental groups call for action to halt the crisis, most activism is limited to changes that main- tain the existing spatial, social, economic and legal framework that de- fines American society.42 Despite knowing for decades that we have been living unsustainable lifestyles, and “hav[ing] had some intuition that it was a binge and the earth couldn’t support it, . . . aside from the easy things (biodegradable detergent, slightly smaller cars) we didn’t do much. We didn’t turn our lives around to prevent it.”43¶ Greenhouse emissions reduction challenges have cropped up on websites across the country, encouraging Americans to change their light bulbs, inflate their tires to the proper tire pressure to ensure op- timal gas mileage, switch to hybrid cars, run dishwashers only when full, telecommute, or buy more efficient washers and dryers.44 However, popular emissions challenge web sites are not suggesting that Ameri- cans give up their cars, move into smaller homes in more densely popu- lated urban neighborhoods near public transportation, or take other substantive actions to mitigate the global climate crisis.45 Even Al Gore,¶ the most famous voice in the climate change movement, reminds his fellow Americans that “[l]ittle things matter . . . buy a hybrid if you can, buy a flex-fuel car if you can. Get a higher mileage car that’s comfort- able for your needs.”46 “[M]any yuppie progressive ‘greens’ are the¶ ones who drove their SUVs to environmental rallies and, even worse, made their homes at the far exurban fringe, requiring massive car de- pendence in their daily lives,” taking residential segregation and racial and spacial hierarchies to previously unimagined dimensions.47 This focus on maintaining one’s privileged lifestyle while making minimal changes reflects the power of the underlying structural impediments blocking a comprehensive response to global climate change in the United States.48 It is not just political inaction that prevents a meaningful response. Millions of Americans do not demand a change in environmental pol- icy because, just as with political elites, it is against the interests of those enjoying white privilege to take genuine steps to combat climate change.49 Real climate action would ultimately require relinquishing the spatial, social, and economic markers that have created and pro- tected whiteness and the privilege it confers.50 Although “we too often fail to appreciate how important race remains as a system for amassing and defending wealth and privilege,” the painfully slow reaction of the American public to the growing dangers of global warming highlights just how important racial privilege remains and how reluctant its bene- ficiaries are to give it up.51 Elite reformists make meaningful change even more remote as they push for behaviors to tweak, but not to change the existing social, economic, and legal hierarchy in the face of “problems, [like global warming] that arise to threaten the predomi-¶ nance of the traditionalist, capitalist ruling class.”52